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Abstract 
This research project examines the hypothesis that democracy and political stability have 
significant effects on economic growth in developing countries. Previous empirical 
studies find rather ambiguous results when testing for the relationship between 
democracy and growth. This paper extends these past studies by focusing on the effects 
of democracy and political stability in developing countries. It also attempts to 
differentiate the effects of political stability and democracy on economic growth. The 
results suggest that democracy has a negative effect on economic growth. However the 
results also suggest that political stability regardless of the level of democracy has the 
greatest effect on a countries economic growth. 
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I) INTRODUCTION 
Many studies have been conducted on the relationship between democracy and 
growth. The general understanding of the relationship between economic growth and 
democracy is that democracy fosters economic growth relative to non-democracies in a 
given country. Nevertheless this theory has come under the scrutiny ofmany economists, 
who point out that countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, which achieved 
'super growth' regardless ofthe fact that the governments of these countries are 
authoritarian in nature (Nelson and Singh 1998). However, the results of statistical 
studies conducted on this subject have been rather inconclusive. This paper argues that 
such inconclusive results stem from using reduced form models that pool data from 
developing and developed countries. This paper focuses on only developing countries to 
test the hypothesis that democracy can have a negative effect on their economic growth 
and that it is political stability regardless of the extent ofdemocracy that would have the 
most significant effect on growth in dev~loping countries. 
Economic growth and Democracy are two terms that have often been heard used 
in the same context by public commentators, politicians, and popular media. Thus we are 
often faced with the question of whether the theory that democracy fosters economic 
growth is simply the wishful thinking ofpeople who value both democracy and growth. 
The importance oflooking at this question in greater detail lies in the fact that it is a key 
policy question for many international aid institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. 
This issue is particularly important to many developing countries due to the fact that one 
of the most important preconditions towards obtaining aid from these institutions is 
political liberalization. Thus, are policies of western countries that encourage the 
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installation of democracy to spur economic growth in countries like Somalia and Haiti of 
any practical use? 
In many developing countries political liberalization can lead to economic 
policies that are detrimental to economic growth. As an example, countries that have a 
greater level ofpolitical freedom may not implement policies such as trade liberalization 
that could have a beneficial effect on growth. This can be illustrated by examining the 
situation that South Korea faced during the late 1980's when its government tried to 
move towards not only greater political freedom but also economic freedom. Thus with 
democratization in full swing, Korean interest groups, such as the farmers, agitated 
against free market policies, such as import liberalization, preventing the existing 
government from implementing free market policies. 
Therefore, I will approach this topic by first looking at some of the theories and 
important literature pertaining to how democracy affects growth. In this section I shall 
also review some of the shortcomings of
\ 
previous empirical studies with reference to this 
subject. The subsequent section lays out the four hypotheses relating the effect of the 
political variables used in this paper on economic growth. Section IV explains the data 
sets that are used to estimate the relevant hypotheses. Sections V and VI explore how 
democracy, political stability, economic growth and government effectiveness affect 
economic growth through their influence on variables such as investment, human capital, 
and government spending. This model, which is referred to as the 'indirect/direct effects 
model' estimates the direct and indirect effects that political stability and electoral system 
have on the rate of economic growth. In the results section, I will present the results of 
my empirical model and compare these results, with the results that I expected from 
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previous research. I will also discuss in this section the reasons why the results of certain 
explanatory variables differ from what was predicted by my model. And finally, I will 
conclude my paper by summing up what the important results of this study are and how 
these results apply to important policy choices made by governments and aid-institutions. 
II) LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the current literature there are two broadly opposing views pertaining to this link 
between growth and the degree ofdemocracy, the "comparability perspective" and the 
"conflict perspective" (De Haan and Siermann, 1995) The 'comparability perspective' is 
espoused by a school of economists and political scientists that maintains that democracy 
has a beneficial effect on growth both directly and indirectly. On the other hand, the 
conflict perspective is defended by a second school of thought that maintains that 
democracy has an adverse effect on growth. Defenders of the conflict perspective point to 
countries such as Hong Kong, Singapor~ and Taiwan, which achieved "super growth" 
regardless of the fact that the governments of these countries were authoritarian in nature 
(Nelson and Singh 1998). On the other hand, others point to the dismal performance of 
economies in authoritarian regimes in many African countries. The Economist states, "If 
dictators made countries rich, Africa would be an economic colossus" (Nelson and 
Singh, 1998). The arguments between these two views follow along the lines ofwhich 
regime can maintain property rights, curtail current consumption, and implement timely 
and appropriate economic policies that both lead to and sustain growth. 
Proponents of the comparability perspective argue that democratic institutions 
create a system of checks and balances that effectively control governmental power and 
3
 
-limit the potential for the implementation ofunpopular policies. Secondly, it has also 
been argued that democracies are better able to protect private property, which many 
economists claim to be the "foundation ofmaterial progress" (De Haan and Siermann 
1996). Also, human capital is another channel through which democracy could effect 
growth as democracies give greater weight towards the basic needs of the public. 
Barro(l996), in his empirical study investigating the relationship between democracy and 
economic growth, finds a non linear relationship in which more democracy enhances 
growth at low levels of political freedom but depresses growth once a moderate level of 
political freedom has been achieved. 
Development requires large amounts of investment that requires substitution away 
from current consumption. Thus, proponents of the conflict perspective are wont to argue 
that a democratic government is unable to implement such policies for fear of being voted 
out of office. It has been stated that, "Such investment programs imply cuts in current 
consumption that would be painful at t~ low levels of living that exist in almost all 
developing countries ...No political party can hope to win a democratic election on the 
platform of current sacrifices for a bright future" (przeworski and Limongi, 1993). 
Authoritarian regimes have more centralized power with which to "orchestrate economic 
growth" than democracies, particularly in developing countries (Minier 1998). Neither is 
there a principle that claims that non-democratic governments cannot maintain private 
property. On the other hand, it has been argued by przeworski and Limongi that 
democracies in developing countries may actually have an adverse effect on private 
property rights: "Democracy offers those who are poor, oppressed or otherwise miserable 
a consequence of the initial endowments an opportunity to redress via the state. Endowed 
4 
with political power in the form ofuniversal suffrage, those who suffer as a consequence 
ofprivate property will attempt to use this power to expropriate the riches ...The 
widespread usage ofdemocracy as a 'proxy' for guarantees ofproperty rights .. .is thus 
unjustifiable" (przeworski and Limongi 1993). 
Previous empirical studies 
In conclusion it can simply be stated that the relationship between the extent of 
democracy and economic growth has, at best, been ambiguous. A survey article written 
by przeworski and Limongi on the supposed link between democracy and economic 
freedom reports that out of 18 studies surveyed, only 7 found statistically significant 
relationships.( Przeworski and Limongi 1993) Another survey conducted by Bomer 
reports that out of 16 empirical studies conducted on this link, only 3 had a positive and 
relatively robust association between democracy and growth. Also, three of these 
empirical studies discovered a negative association between these two variables, whilst
\ 
the remaining 10 had ambiguous results (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001). Such results have 
led some economists to subscribe to what Haan and Siermann call the "skeptical view". 
This view doubts the existence of a viable statistical relationship between democracy and 
economic development. Instead they theorize that the kind ofpolicies that are pursued by 
the government, institutional arrangements, and political stability are far more important 
than regime type (Haan and Siennann, 1996). 
One of the biggest shortcomings ofmany ofthe studies (Barro,1991; Weede, 
1996; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001) conducted on the relationship between democracy 
and economic freedom is that they use samples that lump together countries that have 
5 
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well developed democratic systems and recently democratized developing countries. / 
Lumping these dissimilar countries together in one study, which is trying to discover the 
relationship between democracy and economic growth may result in rather biased results 
that indicate democracy as a significant variable that effects growth. As mentioned 
before, the importance of a study looking into the relationship between these two 
variables is its importance to developing countries. Also in many developing countries, 
productivity and democracy seem to come at the expense of each other. Therefore I will 
be limiting my sample size to include only developing countries. 
Secondly, this paper argues that political stability is not necessarily a function of 
democracy. According to Tavares and Wacziarg, one of the characteristics of democracy 
is ''transparent rules for the alternation ofpolitical forces in power" which discourages 
uncertainty. (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001) However, looking at the tyranny of 
majoritarian democracies, such as in democratic Sri Lanka, confirms that democracies do 
not automatically guarantee political st~bility (Gupta, Madhavan, and Blee, 1998). 
Therefore, this paper will use political stability as an exogenous variable. This paper 
basically puts forward the argument that the linkage between economic growth and 
political stability is robust regardless of the form ofpolitical regime existing in a given 
country. 
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III) RESEARCH HYPOTHESES. 
The model presented here is an adaptation of the standard neoclassical one-sector 
growth model used by Barro in his paper, "Democracy and Growth". This model, like 
most models explaining the relationships between democracy and growth (Barro 1990; 
Gupta, Dipak, Madhavan and Blee 1998, Tavares and Wacziarg 2001), assumes that that 
governments provide law and order, enforce contracts, and defend private parties against 
external threats, as well as provide inputs for private production that are not efficiently 
supplied through the market. Therefore, these models begin with the assumption that 
governments are the locus ofdecision making, playing a significant role in optimizing 
efficiency, growth, and welfare (Przeworski and Limongi 1993). Consequently, it can be 
argued that variables such as physical and human capital are affected by the stability and 
type of government in a given country. Thus the political dimension that this paper 
addresses has been added to the neoclassical growth model using the following variables; 
level of democracy, level ofpolitical stability, level of government effectiveness, and 
level of economic freedom. 
Hypothesis I) - Democracy has a significant negative impact on economic growth in 
developing countries. 
The importance of the level of democracy can be illustrated using the following 
example. Let us first assume that the economy in a given country consists of a number of 
rent seeking groups. In a democratic country the government is then controlled by one of 
these groups or a coalition ofdifferent groups. Such environments automatically promote 
rent seeking as the government seeks to satisfy the ruling group or coalition of groups 
7
 
with the hopes of gaining or staying in power. It can be stated simply that the government 
is selfish, in the sense that it is concerned purely with the welfare of its own members 
(Anthony Annett, 2001). The group that the government represents is important as the 
government must then choose between consuming or investing in physical capital. Thus 
the government faces a trade-offbetween implementing policies that build political 
capital through rent seeking activities that favor current consumption and growth oriented 
policies. Thus developing countries with democratic regimes are more likely to promote 
consumption at the cost of savings. 
Hypothesis II) - Political stability is significant positive determinant of growth. 
In this paper, the probability of losing power is associated directly with the degree 
ofpolitical instability in the country. Such instability can have serious consequences on 
economic growth as there is a direct connection between capital flight and political 
instability. When a political regime is upstable, saving rates decrease as instability 
compels consumers to increase spending as their savings could become worthless. 
Savings also become redundant when political instability leads to the displacement of 
people, depriving them of a source ofliving. Investors' demand for fixed capital stocks 
will also decrease with increasing political instability. Even when investors do invest, 
they tend to favor industries and investment opportunities that are liquid and speculative. 
Thus, investment in such countries tends towards low productivity industries that are not 
capital intensive which would provide the foundation for development. As a result, two 
of the most essential factors that sustain economic growth, investment and savings, are 
affected adversely by political upheavals (Y.Feng, 2001). 
8 
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Hypothesis III) - The level of Economic freedom in a country is an important 
determinant of economic growth. 
Numerous studies have documented a robust positive effect of economic freedom 
on economic growth. Economic freedom can be described simply as a measure that 
characterizes the degree to which an economy is a market economy. In other words, it is a 
measurement of the ability to enter into voluntary contracts with limited government 
intervention in the form of regulation, taxes, and rule of law which upholds contracts and 
protects private property (N. Berggren, 2003). So how does economic freedom affect 
growth? Economic freedom increases growth through its effects on the neoclassical 
growth factors, physical capital and human capital. According to Douglas North, the type 
of institutions in place has an important effect on the incentives of economic actors to be 
more efficient or inefficient. Thus, theoretically, institutions that promote economic 
freedom also have the capacity to promote incentives which in tum promotes 
productivity. Consequently, it can be cl~.med that economic freedom has the capacity to 
promote efficiency by encouraging competition due to fewer regulations and government 
enterprises. It also enables specialization and economies of scale, as economic freedom 
"enables talent to be allocated to where it generates the highest value" (N. Berggren, 
2003). Thus, economic freedom may constitute an explanatory factor for growth in 
developing countries. 
9
 
Hypothesis IV) - Ceteris Paribus the level of Government effectiveness has a positive 
effect on economic growth. 
It has been argued that the neoclassical result of efficient markets holds up only 
when there are no transaction costs. However, when it is costly to transact, then 
institutions matter. According to Douglas North, "Institutions form the incentive structure 
of a society, and the political and economic institutions, in consequence, are the 
underlying determinants of economic performance" (North, D.C, 1994). Thus, the 
government effectiveness indicator denotes the quality of public service provision, the 
quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil 
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
policies (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2004). In other words, government 
effectiveness measures the competence of government institutions. Thus, theoretically, if 
government institutions were functioning efficiently by reducing the costs of transactions, 
there would be an increase in the prod{1ctivity of the neoclassical growth variables. This 
in tum would stimulate economic growth. 
10 
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IV) DATA. 
My model will utilize cross sectional data from 112 developing countries 
This study uses data from a number of sources including the 2003 edition of the World 
development Indicators, Heritage index, Polity IV project as well as the World Bank 
government indicators. My variables measuring the quality of governance such as 
political stability and the effectiveness of governance were obtained from the World 
Bank government indicators. The variable measuring the level of democracy in each 
country was obtained from the Polity IV index. Most of the variables, including growth 
and the democracy index, enter as four- five year averages, which limit the potential for 
measurement error and business cycle effects driving our results. 
The dependent variable used in this paper, GDP_Growth, will be defined as 
simply the average annual growth rate in real GDP, expressed as a percentage change in a 
countries GDP based on constant 1995 U.S Dollars. This variable has been averaged 
between the years 1999 and 2002 to elirv-inate business cycle effects. These particular 
years have been chosen as they are more representative of the state of the present-day 
world economy and they avoid the effects of the Asian financial crisis. All variables used 
in this study are defined in Table 1 along with their means and standard deviation. 
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Table 1 -Variable Dermitions 
Variables Type Standard Mean 
Deviation 
GROWTH GDP Average GDP rates of cOWltries 2.615 3.063 
between the years 1999-2002 
System variables 
POL STABILITY Political instability between the .828 -.332 
years 1998-2002 
DEMOCRACY Level of Democracy between the 5.886 2.343 
years 1998-2002 
EC FREEDOM Level of Economic freedom .604 3.2 
between the years 1998-2002 
GOV-EFFECTIVNESS Average of the year 1998-2002 0.817 -.192 
Other variables 
Ln(GDP) Initial GDP in the year 1998 1.899 23.26 
POP GROWTH Average population growth rates .626 1.902 
between the years 1999-2002 
Production function 
variables 
INVESTMENT Average Investment rates in the 5.979 21.125 
years 1998-2002as % of GDP 
ILLIT Illiteracy rates between the years 20.144 27.075 
1990-2001 
GOV CONSUMPTION Average Government spending as 5.984 13.784 
% of GDP between 1998-2002 
This paper seeks to define and calculate the direct and indirect effects of the 
extent ofdemocracy and other governance indicators on economic growth. I have used 
several distinct measures, which I shall define as system variables to approximate the 
effect ofdecisions made by the government on economic growth. The first system 
variable I use is democracy. The indicator for democracy I will be using is complied by 
the Polity IV project. In this index democracy consists of three elements: the presence of 
institutions and procedures that allow citizens to express effective preferences, existence 
of institutionalized constraints on the exercise ofpower by the executive, and the 
guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in acts ofpolitical participation (Marshal and 
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Jaggers, 2002). On the other hand, an autocracy is defined as a regime that sharply 
restricts or suppresses competitive political participation. Thus the democracy index 
ranges from a scale of+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) 
The next system variable that I use is an index for political stability compiled by 
the World Bank. This index measures the likelihood that the government in power will be 
destabilized by unconstitutional means, including domestic violence and terrorism. This 
index captures the idea that the likelihood ofwrenching changes in government can affect 
the quality of governance by affecting the continuity ofpolicies (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2004). 
Next, this paper uses economic freedom as a system variable, because the 
openness of an economy depends primarily on the decision of the government. This 
variable has been chosen as a system variable since the extent of democracy has little 
effect on the openness of an economy. To illustrate, China is totalitarian and India is a 
democracy, but they both have roughly the same level of economic freedom. Economic 
\ 
freedom measures the number and/or effectiveness of trade barriers such as trade 
restrictions, monetary policy, and restrictions on capital flows and investments in a 
particular country. 
The final system variable this paper uses is the variable "Government 
Effectiveness" made available by the World Bank to indicate the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement policies. This variable measures, the quality of 
public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, and the competency of civil 
servants. In other words, this variable measures the government's ability to produce and 
implement policies and deliver public goods. Like the democracy index, economic 
13
 
freedom index, and the political stability index, this index is also averaged over a period 
of5 years. 
The production function variables were obtained via The World Development 
Indicators. Due to the lack ofdata for government final consumption in the years 1998­
2002, I have used an average ofgovernment consumption as a percentage ofGDP 
between the years 1996-2001. This variable includes all government current expenditures 
for purchases of goods and services but excludes expenditures on government capital 
formation. 
Net investment in physical capital enters this model as an average of the 
percentage ofGDP between the years 1998-2002. This variable consists of outlays on 
additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. 
The final measure I use as a production function variable is a proxy for changes in human 
capital formation. For this I have used the average in illiteracy rates between the years 
1990 and 2001. Adult literacy rate me~ures basic reading and writing skills of adults and 
a portion of these adults then comprise the workforce. The lag in this variable is justified 
as it can be argued that human capital does not affect productivity and thereby increase 
growth rates instantaneously. Conversely, it must also be pointed out that this measure 
captures only very basic skills and may not be the best approximation to capture worker 
productivity. 
The rest of the independent variables were obtained via The World Development 
Indicators as well. To compare results of this regression with that ofRobert Harro, I have 
used some of the same variables he uses in his estimation of the neoclassical growth 
model. Therefore I used the log of initial GDP, in the year 1998 to represent the 
14 
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conditional rate ofconvergence of these developing countries. Next, I use the average of 
population growth between the years 1999-2002, to capture the effects of population 
growth on economic growth. It has been argued that population growth effects economic 
growth by affecting the portion ofcapital available to each worker. In other words, an 
increase in population tends to reduce the share of capital per worker reducing the 
marginal productivity of each worker. 
V) INDIRECT/ DIRECT AFFECTS MODEL. 
This paper will be utilizing an intervening variables framework to examine the 
effects of democracy and political stability on economic growth. In this model 
background variables such as democracy, political stability, economic freedom, and 
government effectiveness can have direct and indirect effects on a countries economic 
growth. Diagram 1 shows the above mentioned relationship schematically: 
\ 
Intervening 
Variables~ 
Background I ~
 
L....-_v_an_·_a_bl_e_s----'I------------.... 
~ 
Figure 1 
Thus each of these background variables will exert a direct effect on the GDP 
growth in a particular country. However, as mentioned before, this paper hypothesizes 
that these variables can affect GDP indirectly by affecting a number of intervening 
15 
variables. As can be seen in Figure 2, political instability, democracy, economic freedom 
and government effectiveness can effect growth directly, but they could also affect 
growth indirectly by increasing the level of investments in a country, spending on 
education, and/or increasing the productivity ofphysical or human capital 
Human 
/ Capital ~ /~.-------------,~ I Investment 
Democracy 
GDPPolitical stability 
Growth(Direct Effect)
 
Ec-Freedom
 
'"
 
Gov effectiveness 
Population 
growth 
Government 
spending 
\ 
Figure 2. Illustration of Direct and Indirect Paths 
In this model there are 3 paths in which democracy and political instability can 
affect the rate of growth. Firstly, it can be argued that political stability has a significant 
effect on the level of investment as it increases investor confidence in a particular 
country. The effect of democracy on investment is tentative. Tavares and Wacziarg claim 
that democracy effect growth is political instability: "Political instability creates an 
incentive for rulers to adopt predatory behavior vis-a.-vis the private resources of the 
economy". In a democracy such predatory behavior is discouraged due to the fact that 
decision making is more open to public debate. This in turn also facilitates a smooth 
16 
transition ofpower through public elections. Therefore a more stable democratic 
government gives investors an assurance of the safety of their investments. On the flip 
side in a democratic country where income redistribution is widely endorsed, it is 
unlikely that investors will be willing to invest. However, as mentioned earlier, 
government effectiveness and economic freedom set up the institutions necessary to 
increase the productivity of investment. Trade liberalization and effective government 
institutions encourage more secure property rights, thereby increasing investor 
confidence. 
Human capital is another indirect channel through which democracy affects 
growth. As mentioned earlier most democracies place great weight on providing the basic 
needs of the public. This leads to higher spending by democracies towards education. 
This public funding of education decreases the cost of education, which increases the 
number of people who are able to receive an education. This in turn leads to a growth in 
human capital, which according to the ~o-c1assical growth model is one of the main 
factors that increase the level of growth in an economy. It can also be maintained that 
human capital is indirectly affected by instability. According to A. Annett, political 
instability leads to higher government consumption aimed simply at reducing the risk of 
losing office, thus leaving little room to spend on human capital development (Annett, 
2001). Conversely, economic freedom and government effectiveness promote human 
capital development as they encourage specialization, thereby increasing the productivity 
ofhuman capital. 
The third path shows the indirect effect democracy and political instability have 
on economic growth via government spending. The reason for this lies in the fact that the 
17 
larger the size of the government, the larger the costs that the government accrues, which 
leads to a lower fiscal residuum. A fiscal residuum is the property of the citizens of that 
country, meaning that no member of the government can use it for private purposes. 
Przeworski and Limongi maintain that who has rights to the fiscal residuum depends 
largely on the type of regime. In a democracy citizens have the right to decide the size of 
the government and have the right to the fiscal residuum (przeworski and Limongi, 
1993). Therefore, a democracy that gives more influence to the poor in policy making has 
a tendency to increase government interventions for such purposes as income 
redistribution funded by higher taxation. The implementation and administration of such 
policies requires a large government. This leads to increased government spending which 
has adverse affects on growth. Political instability also increases government spending 
which is aimed at placating the opposition. 
Thus this paper hypothesizes that democracy and political instability have both 
direct and indirect effects on the rate Qf growth achievable by a country. The estimation 
of direct and indirect effects of the background variables on economic growth involves 
estimating several OLS regression models. The first is the background model, which 
regresses growth against four political background variables. 
Equation 1: Background Model 
GROWTH_GDP =al + Jh (DEMOCRACY) + P3 (POL_STABILITY) + 
P4(EC_FREEDOM) + Ps(GOV_EFFECTIVENESS) 
18 
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Next, we regress economic growth against the four background variables and the 6 
intervening variables. 
Equation 2: Overall Model 
GROWTH_GDP = 0.2 + 1321 (POL_STABILITY) + P22(DEMOCRACY) + 
P23(EC_FREEDOM) + P24(GOV_EFFECTIVENESS) + P2s(INVESTMENT) + 
P26(Ln GDP) + P27(POP_GROWTH) + P2s(ILLIT) + P29(GOV_SPENDING) + 
P30(EC_FREEDOM) 
After estimating the background and overall models, 4 auxiliary OLS regressions 
are run for the intervening variables. These are necessary to determine how the two 
background variables influence each of the intervening variables. 
Auxiliary Equations for Intervening Variables: 
Equation 3 
INVESTMENT = 0.3 + P31(pOL_STABILITy) + P32(DEMOCRACy) + 
P33(EC_FREDOM) + P34(GOV_EFFECTIVENESS) 
Equation 4 
\ 
ILLIT =a.. + P41(pOL_STABILITy) + P42(DEMOCRACy) + P43(EC_FREDOM) + 
P44(GOV_EFFECTIVENESS) 
Equation 5 
GOV_SPENDING = as + PSl(pOL_STABILITY) + Ps2(DEMOCRACy) + 
PS3(EC_FREDOM) + PS4(GOV_EFFECTIVENESS) 
To illustrate how these models can be used to evaluate the total, direct, and 
indirect effects of democracy and political instability on GROWTH_GDP, let us look at 
the effects ofa change in (POL_STABILITY) on GROWTH_GDP. By taking the total 
derivative of the overall model with respect to political instability, we can isolate the 
direct and indirect effects. 
19
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Equation 6 
(~GROWTH_GDP/~POL_STABILITY) =(OGROWTH_GDPIBPOL_STABILITY) + 
(OGROWTH_GDPI BINVESTMENT) * (BINVESTMENTIBPOL_STABILITy) + 
(BGROWTH_GDPIBILLIT) * (BILLITIBPOL_STABILITY) + 
(BGROWTH_GDPIBGOV_SPENDING) * (BGOV_SPENDINGIBPOL_STABILITy) 
The derivative on the left hand side represents the total effect of a change in 
political instability on GDP growth. The first partial derivative on the right hand side of the 
equation, (BGROWTH_GDPIBPOL_STABILITY), represents the direct effect (~21)' The 
products that follow this direct effect correspond to an indirect effect through each 
particular intervening variable, and the sum of these is the total indirect effect. The first 
tenn, (BGROWTH_GDPI BINVESTMENT), is the coefficient of that particular intervening 
variable on GDP growth (~25)' The next tenn, (BINVESTMENTIBPOL_STABILITY), 
represents the coefficient of the relevant background variable and the intervening variable 
\ 
(~31)' The product of these two coefficients serves as an estimate of the indirect effect of 
political instability through the intervening variable, investment. The remaining indirect 
effects are computed in a similar manner. The sum of the four indirect effects is the total 
indirect effect. 
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VI) RESULTS 
The results and findings ofdirect and indirect effects discussed above are 
presented in this section. Table 3 presents the results ofthe OLS regression estimation of 
GROWTH_GDP for the background model and the overall model. The background 
model, as mentioned above, includes only democracy, political stability, economic 
freedom, and government effectiveness as independent variables. The overall model adds 
the remaining independent variables to the background model. 
Table 3 - Regression Estimates ofGROWTH_GDP 
Variables Background Overall Model 
Model 
Constant 
DEMOCRACY 
GOv_EFFEVTIVNESS 
EC]REEDOM 
POL STABILITY 
Ln (GDP) 
INVESTMENT 
ILLITERACY 
GOVSPENDING 
AdjustedR2 
Sample Size 
.563 
(.329) 
-.085 
(-1.76)* 
.487 
(1.44) 
.951 
(1.79)* 
.685 
(1.86)* 
.071 
91 
.544 
(.108) 
-.077 
(-1.49) 
.651 
(2.00)** 
-.106
, (-.178) 
.464 
(1.205) 
.018 
(.113) 
-.440 
(-.829) 
0.150 
(3.29)*** 
0.050 
(2.96)*** 
-0.059 
(-1.31)* 
.255 
81 
Note: * Indicates significance at the .10 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; 
and *** indicates significance at the .01 level. 
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Including political stability, democracy, economic freedom and government 
effectiveness in the background regression (Table 3) produced a large and significant 
coefficient for POL_STABILITY, DEMOCRACY and EC_FREEDOM. These 
coefficients represent the "total effects" of these political variables on growth in the 
direct/indirect model. All three of the results are consistent with the hypotheses stated 
earlier. They suggest that political stability and economic freedom lead to higher growth 
rates, and that democracy leads to lower growth rates. The coefficient for government 
effectiveness, however, was insignificant even though it proved to have the correct sign. 
Subsequently, the overall model was estimated after controlling for the three 
intervening variables, initial GDP and population growth (Table 3). Recall that the 
coefficients to the four political variables in the overall model are the "direct effects" of 
these variables on economic growth. In the overall model the coefficient for political 
stability, democracy, and economic freedom was insignificant, even though they proved 
to have the predicted sign. On the oth~ hand, GOV_EFFECTIVENESS, which had been 
insignificant in the background model, turned out to be significant. The variables 
Ln(GDP), Ln(POP_GROWTH) and intervening variable GOV_SPENDING have the 
correct sign but prove to be insignificant. The coefficient for the intervening variables 
INVESTMENT was significant with the correct sign. 
The theory presented in Section II leads us to the hypothesis that an increase in 
human capital will increase the productivity of existing inputs, thereby increasing growth 
rates. llliteracy rates were used as a proxy for human capital. However, the results show 
that the proxy for human capital, ILLIT, has an unexpected positive sign, suggesting that 
greater illiteracy leads to higher growth. Initially this unexpected result was attributed to 
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using the wrong proxy. However, even when other proxies for human capital were used, 
such as literacy rates, government spending on education, and the HDI education index, 
there was, in every case, an unexpected inverse relationship between human capital and 
growth rates. 
Conventional wisdom maintains that "The education and training ofmen and of 
women contributed directly to economic growth through its effects on productivity, 
earnings, job mobility, entrepreneurial skills, and technological innovation" (Easterly, 
W.72). However, in William Easterly's article "Educated for what?" Easterly points out a 
number of reasons as to why educational expansion in developing countries has had 
distinctly disappointing results. First, he argues that schooling pays off only when 
government actions create incentives for growth rather than redistribution: "In an 
economy with extensive government intervention, the activity with the highest returns to 
skills might be lobbying the government for favors." Finally, he also claims that in a 
country with an economy which creates no incentives to invest in the future,
\ 
administrative targets for "universal primary education" are of little value to growth (W. 
Easterly). 
The regression analysis was also carried out separately for each of the intervening 
variables to estimate the effects of the background variables on the intervening variables. 
The auxiliary regression results for the 3 intervening variables appear in Table 4. The 
results in this table have been obtained by regressing the three intervening variables 
(INVESTMENT, GOV_SPENDING and ILLIT) against each of the four background 
variables (DEMOCRACY, POL_STABILITY, EC_FREEDOM and 
GOV_EFFECTIVENESS.) \ 
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Only POL_STABILITY and EC_FREEDOM had significant coefficients in the 
three auxiliary equations. POL_STABILITY had the expected significant effect on 
INVESTMENT but had an unexpected and significant positive effect on government 
spending. EC_FREEDOM has one significant coefficient in the 3 auxiliary regressions 
(Table 4). Thus, EC_FREEDOM had a large, unexpected and significant negative effect 
on ILLIT. 
Table 4 - Regressions of the four intervening variables on background variables 
DEMOCRACY and POL STABILITY.
 
Variable INVESTMENT GOV SPENDING ILLIT
 
Constant 20.272 17.842 -8.424 
(4.716)*** (-4.552)*** (-.645) 
DEMOCRACY 0.004 -0.124 -.519 
(.032) (-1.098) (-1.408) 
GOV_EFFECTIVENESS 
-1.014 0.207 2.854 
, 
(-1.205) (.269) (1.104) 
EC]REEDOM 0.436 -0.976 11.460*** 
(.328) (-.805) (2.829) 
POLITICAL STABILITY 1.893 1.617 -2.666 
(2.041)** (1.904)* (-.937) 
Adjusted R2 .02 .035 .170 
Sample Size 90 89 86 
Note: * Indicates significance at the .10 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; 
and *** indicates significance at the .01 level. 
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There are several results in the auxiliary regressions that deserve note. First 
economic freedom had a rather surprising effect on illiteracy rates, as the coefficient 
shows an unexpected positive sign, suggesting that greater economic freedom would lead 
to higher illiteracy rates. Second, as hypothesized, political stability had a positive effect 
on investment. The countries in our sample that had greater political stability were much 
more likely to attract greater investment. This result is consistent with the earlier work of 
y. Feng (2001). Third, political stability unexpectedly increases government spending. 
All three of these results imply that there could be significant indirect effects since 
economic freedom and political stability both influence intervening variables. 
To determine the magnitude of the Total, direct and indirect effects ofpolitical 
background variables on economic growth, this paper followed the procedure described 
in Section V. The results are presented in Table 5. The ''total effect" of each background 
variable on GROWTH GDP is the coefficients of each of these variables in the 
''background model" presented in Table 3. Recall that this model includes only the four
\ 
political variables but not the three intervening variables. Therefore, the total effect 
should be interpreted as the influence of each political variable on the growth rates of a 
country after controlling for the effects of the other political variables. 
The direct effects reported in Table 5 are the effects of each political background 
variable on GROWTH_GDP after controlling for all other political variables and the 
intervening variables. Each of the direct effects is the coefficient to the background 
variables (DEMOCRACY, POL_STABILITY, EC_GROWTH and 
GOV_EFFECTIVENESS) in the overall model presented in Table 3. The indirect effects 
in Table 5 are the total effects minus the direct effects. 
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Table 5- Total, Direct and Indirect Effects of Background Variables DEMOCRACY and 
POL STABILITY on GROWTH GDP. 
Background Total Effects Direct Effects Indirect Effects 
Variable 
DEMOCRACY 
-0.085 -0.077 -0.008 
(-1.761)* (-1.491) 
GOV EFFECTIVENESS 0.487 0.651 -0.164 
(1.443) (2.000)* 
EC]REEDOM 0.951 -0.106 1.057 
(1.787)* (-.178) 
POL_STABILITY 0.685 0.464 0.221 
(1.860)* (1.205) 
Sample Size 91 85 
Note: * Indicates significance at the .10 level; ** indicates significance at the .05 level; 
and *** indicates significance at the .01 level. 
As mentioned above, each indirect effect reported in Table 5 consists of the sum 
of three paths. The indirect effect paths are computed from the coefficient in the auxiliary , 
regressions and the overall model. Each indirect effect can be thought of as the total 
influence of the political variables on GROWTH_GDP through the intervening variables. 
For example, the indirect effect of political stability on growth is the sum of the indirect 
effects of POL_STABILITY on GROWTH_GDP through INVESTMENT, ILLIT, and 
GOV SPENDING. As can be seen in Table 5 there are only two significant indirect 
effects on EC_GROWTH. Each of these significant indirect effects are computed as the 
product of the coefficient to the POL_STABILITY and EC_FREEDOM variables found 
in the appropriate auxiliary regression in Table 4 multiplied by the intervening variable 
coefficient from the overall model in Table 3. Table 6 presents the computed indirect 
effects. 
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Table 6 - Estimated Indirect Effects ofPolitical Stability and Economic Freedom 
Variables on GROWTH_GDP through Intervening Variables* 
INVESTMENT GOV-SPENDING ILLITBackground 
Variable 
EC]REEDOM N/A N/A 0.576 
0.284 -0.097 N/A 
The subsequent paragraphs examine the total, direct, and indirect effects of each 
of the four political background variables. As can be seen in Table 5, democracy proves 
to have a significant total effect on GROWTH_GDP. This coefficient is negative, which 
is consistent with our hypothesis that democracy has a negative impact on the growth in 
developing countries. Virtually all of this comes through the direct effect of democracy 
on growth. The indirect effect is very small. From the auxiliary equations we see that 
\ 
democracy is not a significant predictor of any of the intervening variables. (Table 4) 
Table 5 shows that government effectiveness (GOV_EFFECTIVENESS), on the 
other hand, did not have a significant total effect on economic growth. However, the 
significant coefficient for GOV-EFFECTIVENESS in the overall model proves that 
government effectiveness has a significant direct effect on economic growth. Thus, 
holding all other intervening variables and background variables constant, 
GOV_EFFECTIVENESS affects economic growth positively. The indirect effect of 
government effectiveness on economic growth proved to be negative and rather small. 
From the auxiliary equations we see that government effectiveness is not a significant 
predictor of any of the intervening variables. 
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Economic freedom proved to have a significant total effect on economic growth. 
(Table 5) The results suggest that economic freedom has an insignificant direct effect on 
economic growth. However, economic freedom has a large positive indirect effect on 
growth. The results from the auxiliary model show only one significant indirect path 
through which economic freedom affects growth. Unexpectedly, this path is through the 
effect of economic freedom on illiteracy rates. (Table 6) Thus, the results of the auxiliary 
models suggest that greater economic freedom leads to greater illiteracy rates, which 
subsequently leads to greater economic growth. 
Political stability has a robust and significant total effect but an insignificant 
direct effect on growth. These results suggest that political stability affects economic 
growth indirectly by its influence on particular intervening variables. From the auxiliary 
equations we see that political stability is a significant predictor of both investment rates 
as well as government spending. (Table 4) The most important indirect path through 
which political stability affects GROWTH_GDP is the level of investment in a country. 
For example, growth rates will increase by 0.28 units solely through the influence of a 
one-unit change in political stability on investment rates. A scatter diagram plotting the 
data points of investment rates on the Y-axis and political stability on the X-axis is 
provided below. 
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Figure 3 - Scatter diagram between political stability and investment rates 
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On the other hand regression results show that growth rates will decrease by 0.097 
units exclusively through the influence ofpolitical stability on government spending. 
However, it can be stated that the negative impact that political stability has on 
government spending is offset through its positive effects on investments. These results 
substantiate the hypothesis that it is political stability, regardless of the level of 
democracy, which would have the most significant effect on growth. 
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CONCLUSION 
In order to substantiate the hypothesis that democracy has a negative effect on 
economic growth in developing countries, this study explored the effects of four kinds of 
political indicators and their impact on economic growth. The political dimension that 
this paper addressed was then subsequently added to the neoclassical growth model using 
the following variables: level of democracy, level ofpolitical stability, level of 
government effectiveness and level of economic freedom. Using a sample consisting of 
data from a number ofdeveloping countries from the years 1998 and 2002, this paper 
found that all the political indicators did in fact affect the economic growth through a set 
of direct and indirect effects (Section V). These findings give a new perspective to 
existing literature, as this paper regards democracy and political stability as independent 
variables. The results have revealed a number ofmechanisms that give an advantage to 
countries that enjoy greater political stability. 
Political instability has a signiflcant indirect effect on economic growth through 
its positive effect on investment rates. The results also suggests that, counter to theory if 
political stability increases by one unit, government spending will increase. However it is 
important to note that this negative effect that political stability has over government 
spending rates is more than compensated for by the positive effect this variable has on 
investment rates. 
Also, as hypothesized, democracies in developing countries were shown to have 
significant negative direct and indirect effects. Thus the non-linear relationship between 
democracy and growth, predicted by Barro (1996) does not seem to exist when the 
sample is limited to developing countries. Government effectiveness did have a 
30 
significant direct effect on economic growth but proved to have little effect on the 
intervening variables. 
Therefore to address the question that I posed at the beginning of this paper, are 
policies ofwestern countries that encourage the installation of democracy to spur growth 
in countries like Somalia and Haiti of any practical use in promoting growth? No. As can 
be seen in this paper, it is the level ofpolitical stability within a given country, regardless 
of regime type, that results in economic growth. Thus governments and aid institutions 
should give greater weight to political stability as a pre-requisite in the provision of aid 
packages. Does this mean that democracy is redundant? No, for democracy is very 
valuable as it guarantees basic human rights. However, this paper suggests that 
democracy cannot be justified as an agent for economic growth. 
\ 
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APPENDIX I 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas, 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, D 
Congo, R 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivore 
Cuba 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominica 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
EI Salva 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia, 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-B 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Republic 
Kuwait 
Lao PDR 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Mauritius' 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
•
 
Puerto R 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Sao Tome 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Sierra L 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Syrian A 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
West Bank 
Yemen, R 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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